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ABSTRACT 
Lax enforcement of environmental protection laws in the formerly communist 
countries of Eastern and Central Europe is offered as one contributing factor to the 
large-scale environmental degradation that these countries have experienced. This 
article empirically examines enforcement responses to water-damaging 4 'acci-
dents' ' (for example, an oil spill) in the Czech Republic for the years 1988-92, a 
time period that spans both the communist political regime and the democratic po-
litical regime. In particular, it focuses on ex post penalties: required remediation 
(for example, cleanup after an oil spill) and monetary fines. Empirical analysis re-
veals the factors driving enforcement strategies in each political period and con-
trasts their influence under the two regimes. In particular, it identifies the operative 
liability rules guiding remediation and monetary fine decisions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
R J E C E N T economic analyses address the poor environmental conditions in 
the transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe.1 Various reasons 
for the environmental degradation experienced by these countries under 
communist rule have been offered: heavy emphasis on pollution-intensive 
* I would like to thank Martin David for his invaluable advice, insight, and support. My 
research has also improved from suggestions offered by Kathleen Segerson, Jim Andreoni, 
Avery Katz, Kathryn Spier, Dan Bromley, Arik Levinson, participants of the Public Work-
shop at the University of Wisconsin—Madison, and discussants at the Association of Envi-
ronmental and Resource Economists annual meetings. Tomas Jelinek provided excellent re-
search assistance. Financial support of my research in the Czech Republic was given by the 
University of Pittsburgh, the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education 
(CERGE), and the United States Agency for International Development (US AID). Last, I 
am deeply indebted to Daniel Pulpan of the Czech Inspection—Water Management Division. 
Needless to say, the material presented here represents only my viewpoint. 
1 For example, see Gordon Hughes, Are the Costs of Cleaning Up Eastern Europe Exag-
gerated? Economic Reform and the Environment, 1 Oxford Rev Econ Pol 106 (1992); Alan 
Krupnick, Ken Harrison, Eric Nickell, and Michael Toman, The Value of Health Benefits 
from Ambient Air Quality Improvements in Central and Eastern Europe: An Exercise in Ben-
efits Transfer, 1 Envir & Resource Econ 307 (1996); K. Hubbard and T. Selden, Environmen-
tal Failures of Central Planning, 7 Socy & Natural Resources 169 (1994). 
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industries, subsidized energy prices that encouraged high rates of energy 
consumption, lack of advanced pollution control technologies, and weak en-
forcement of protection laws. 
Informal studies provide anecdotal evidence of the weak enforcement of 
environmental protection laws in these formerly communist countries.2 
However, no formal studies analyze enforcement under communism or dur-
ing the rise of capitalism. As an attempt to address this issue, this article 
examines the enforcement of water protection laws in the Czech Republic 
during the years 1988-92. This time period spans both politicoeconomic 
systems given that the Czechoslovak communist regime collapsed in No-
vember 1989. In particular, this article analyzes enforcement actions taken 
in response to water-damaging "accidents" (for example, an oil spill),3 fo-
cusing on ex post penalties: required remediation (for example, cleanup of 
a body of water damaged by an oil spill) and monetary fines. From a more 
conceptual framework, these enforcement actions can be regarded as gov-
ernment steps to control stochastic externalities.4 
Water protection in the Czech Republic offers an excellent opportunity 
to examine possibly different enforcement strategies prompted by unprece-
dented political changes. Although water protection laws changed very little 
during the period considered, the priority given to environmental protection 
dramatically changed from the communist regime to the democratic regime. 
While the communist regime overtly suppressed information on environ-
mental conditions, the democratic regime on ascendance immediately re-
leased environmental information and took steps to improve environmental 
conditions.5 Most relevant to this study, the democratic regime declared its 
intentions to increase the enforcement of existing water protection laws. 
To capture water protection efforts in the Czech Republic, this study ex-
ploits very unique and incredibly rich data. Since 1988, the main enforcer 
of water laws—Czech Water Inspection—has maintained a database on all 
observed water-damaging accidents. In addition to information on imposed 
penalties, this database includes extensive details on each accident: date, 
2 For example, see World Bank, 1 - 2 Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Joint Environ-
mental Study (1992). 
3 Of course, some of these events may have not been accidental but instead quite inten-
tional. The distinction does not disrupt this analysis because it seeks to explain government 
reactions, not polluters' motives. 
4 For example, see Steven Shavell, Risk-Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent 
Relationship, 10 Bell J Econ 55 (1979); Mark Cohen, Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Pre-
vent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard, 30 J Law & 
Econ 23 (1987). 
5 Czech Ministry of the Environment, Environment of the Czech Republic: Evolution, Situ-
ations, and Trends to the End of 1989 (1990). 
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location, cause, type of contaminant, economic classification of the respon-
sible party, and any resulting damages (if measured). To complement this 
database, the author gathered much institutional information by analyzing 
all relevant Czech water laws and interviewing numerous Czech environ-
mental authorities and legal experts. 
With a focus on the (possibly) different enforcement strategies imple-
mented under the two political regimes, the thrust of this article is to iden-
tify the driving factors behind penalty decisions during each political period 
and to contrast the factors' influences in the two political periods. Estima-
tion results show that enforcement strategies significantly differ between the 
two political regimes, while many aspects remain similar across the entire 
period considered. The most interesting result is the strong effect of politi-
cal influence on penalty decisions, especially under communism. Most no-
ticeable is the preferential treatment granted to military and foreign entities 
and the diminished preference shown during the democratic period. The 
greater importance of political influence in the communist period is consis-
tent with the potential for and reliance on political maneuvering in that pe-
riod. 
This empirical analysis represents not only the first research on efforts to 
enforce environmental protection laws in the transitional countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe but one of the few empirical analyses of enforce-
ment in any context. Although the law and economics literature provides 
much conceptual work on enforcement and the use of penalties,6 there ex-
ists a relative dearth of empirical work on these issues, especially in the 
environmental area. Analyses by Mark Cohen and Mary Deily and Wayne 
Gray stand out as the only empirical analyses of environmental enforce-
ment.7'8 
6 For example, see Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Analysis, 78 J Pol 
Econ 526 (1968); Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987); Mitchell Poli-
nsky and Steven Shavell, Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of 
Fines, 35 J Law & Econ 133 (1992). 
7 Cohen (cited in note 4); Mark Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/ 
Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Stat-
utes, 82 J Crim L & Criminol 1054 (1992); Mary Deily and Wayne Gray, Enforcement of 
Pollution Regulations in a Declining Industry, 21 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 260 (1991). 
8 Empirical analyses of general enforcement decisions are limited to the following re-
search: Mark Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Sentencing, 
12 Intl Rev L & Econ 12 (1992); J. Finsinger, T. Hoehn, and A. Pototschnig, The Enforce-
ment of Product Liability Rules: A Two-Country Analysis of Court Cases, 11 Intl Rev L & 
Econ 133 (1991); John Nash, To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime: A Theory and Statisti-
cal Estimation of A Multi-Period Optimal Deterrence Model, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 101 
(1991); Edward Snyder, The Effect of Higher Criminal Penalties on Antitrust Enforcement, 
33 J Law & Econ 439 (1990); Malcolm Coate and Fred McChesney, Empirical Evidence on 
FTC Enforcement of the Merger Guidelines, 30 Econ Inquiry 277 (1992). 
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The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section II depicts the two 
political regimes' attitudes toward environmental protection. Section III 
portrays the application of the principal-agent model to the enforcement of 
water protection laws. Section IV describes the Czech enforcement re-
sponses to water-damaging accidents and the database on accidents. Section 
V provides econometric analysis of actual enforcement actions taken in re-
sponse to accidents and identifies the driving factors behind these enforce-
ment actions. Section VI summarizes the results. 
II. WATER AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
A. Political Regimes and Water Protection Enforcement 
When examining Czech government efforts to enforce water protection 
laws in the Czech Republic, two key institutional details prove critical. 
First, the legal framework surrounding water protection changed very little 
during the period 1988-92. Second, the prominence of environmental pro-
tection as a government concern was dramatically different under the com-
munist and democratic regimes: 4 'For more than 40 years, the two republics 
of Czechoslovakia made minimal efforts to protect the environment." 9 As 
evidence of this disregard, the communist government granted priority to 
economic interests over the environment.1 0 Yet Czechoslovak citizens had 
little opportunity to increase environmental protection efforts because infor-
mation on the environment was suppressed, as was most environmental dis-
sidence. 1 1 , 1 2 
For these and other reasons, the former Czechoslovakia now suffers ''se-
vere human and ecological health problems" 1 3 and had acquired the second 
worst environmental quality in Europe by 1989. 1 4 As a matter of fact, 83 
percent of Czech inhabitants considered the environment of their living 
quarters to be unsatisfactory.1 5 Eventually, the Czech ecological crisis 
9 World Bank (cited in note 2). 
1 0 Czech Ministry of the Environment (cited in note 5). 
1 1 Id. 
1 2 Nevertheless, citizens did participate in the enforcement of water protection laws. For 
details on the phenomenon of water-related citizen correspondence, see Dietrich Eamhart, 
Public Influence on Environmental Protection Efforts: Water-Related. Citizen Correspon-
dence in the Czech Republic (unpublished manuscript, Univ Wisconsin—Madison, 1995). 
1 3 World Bank (cited in note 2). 
1 4 Czech Ministry of the Environment (cited in note 5). 
1 5 Czech Ministry of the Environment, Environment of the Czech Republic: State of the 
Environment (1992). 
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caused a loss of confidence in the communist regime and helped precipitate 
the 1989 Velvet Revolution that toppled the regime.1 6 
Once the communist regime collapsed, environmental leaders joined in 
creating the new government, particularly the environmental ministries,17 
and the new democratic regime began taking steps to improve environmen-
tal conditions. Since 1990, the Czech government has been making 4'con-
scientious efforts to institute environmental regulations that comply with in-
ternational standards, especially those of the European Community to 
which it has applied for full membership." 1 8 Most important, the new gov-
ernment announced its intentions to increase "enforcement of existing laws 
considered to be sufficient," such as water protection laws.1 9 
The stark contrast of government priorities toward water quality protec-
tion between the two Czech political regimes offers an excellent opportu-
nity to examine the different enforcement policies implemented in the tran-
sitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
B. Legal Efforts to Protect Water Quality from 
Water-Damaging Accidents 
In addition to other sources, water quality in the Czech Republic has 
been significantly degraded by water-damaging accidents.20 Figure 1 shows 
the annual number of water-damaging accidents during the period 1981 — 
92. Since the end of communist rule in 1989, the number of accidents has 
steadily declined. Certainly, the substantial decline in economic activity 
during this period—real gross national product declined 20.7 percent be-
tween 1989 and 1992—may explain much of this drop. Moreover, in-
creased enforcement may have begun to deter polluters from causing acci-
dents, as suggested by the Czech Ministry of the Environment.2 1 , 2 2 
1 6 Czech Ministry of the Environment (cited in note 5). 
1 7 Tom Atlee, Notes on Czechoslovakian Grassroots Activism: Findings and Recommen-
dations (unpublished manuscript, Czechoslovak Federal Ministry for the Environment, 1991). 
1 8 Ana Goshko, The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in Transition (Congressional Re-
search Service Report for Congress No. 92-52F December 1991). 
1 9 David Hunter and Margaret Bowman, An Overview of the Environmental Community 
in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (unpublished manuscript, Center for International 
Environmental L, 1991). 
2 0 Czech Ministry of the Environment (cited in note 5). 
2 1 Czech Ministry of the Environment (cited in note 15). 
2 2 Following 1986, the number of accidents leapt. Unfortunately, I can provide no good 
explanation for this drastic change. One possible explanation is a break in the series ac-
cording to a change in the reporting procedures. Since the empirical analysis covers only the 
years 1988-92, any potential reporting change between 1986 and 1987 would not affect the 
empirical results. 
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FIGURE 1.—Water-damaging accidents: Czech Republic, 1981-92. Source: Czech Water 
Inspection. 
Czech environmental authorities treat water-damaging accidents as po-
tential violations of statutes banning the improper handling of substances 
harmful to water.2 3 Once a water-damaging accident is detected, water au-
thorities legally have two potential enforcement responses—remediation re-
quirements and monetary fines—as part of their ex post liability policy.2 4 , 2 5 
The theoretical model briefly sketched in the next section captures this type 
of pollution event. 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ON LEGAL ENFORCEMENT 
For my purposes here, I choose to structure the enforcement of Czech 
water protection laws with respect to water-damaging accidents as a princi-
pal-agent model with moral hazard, where a single Czech water authority— 
the principal—has regulatory control over a single polluter—the agent. In 
2 3 Water Act of 1973, Law No. 138 § 23-24. 
2 4 Id, § 27; State Water Administration Act of 1974, Law No. 130 § 24c (most recently 
amended by Czech National Council Act of 1992, Law No. 23). 
2 5 Analysis of all possible government means to control pollution is beyond the scope of 
this article. In particular, this analysis does not examine the formulation of ex ante policies 
concerning potential water-damaging accidents (in other words, ex ante regulations), enforce-
ment of these ex ante policies (for example, facility inspections), or enforcement responses 
to detected violations (for example, forced plant closures). 
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the principal-agent model, the polluter engages in a risky activity which 
randomly causes pollution. The polluter can provide costly effort that re-
duces the likelihood or severity of pollution and selects the level of effort 
that maximizes its expected indirect utility. Since enforcement is costly, the 
polluter is not always detected even though it has caused an accident. When 
the polluter is detected, the Czech water authority can impose a penalty 
which may include remediation and/or a monetary fine. When making these 
decisions, the principal selects an enforcement strategy that minimizes ex-
pected social costs. 2 6 
I V . WATER-DAMAGING ACCIDENTS 
After framing the applicable theory, I next empirically analyze Czech au-
thorities' use of remediation requirements and monetary fines as enforce-
ment responses to water-damaging accidents—possible violations of stat-
utes banning the improper handling of harmful substances. In particular, the 
analysis identifies whether water authorities applied a strict liability rule, 
which assigns penalties whenever damages are caused regardless of agents' 
effort, or a negligence rule, which assigns penalties only when effort is 
found to be negligent. 
A. Enforcement Responses to Water-Damaging Accidents 
No general procedure for imposing remediation requirements exists. 
However, in certain situations, the rule for imposing remediation require-
ments is dictated by test results of potentially contaminated soil and/or 
groundwater,27 which indicates a strict liability rule since any preventive ac-
tions taken by the polluter are ignored.28 However, according to the Water 
Act of 1973, remediation is only imposed when an obligation has been 
breached, suggesting a negligence rule. 2 9 
The State Water Administration Act of 1974 guides monetary fines im-
2 6 See note 40 below for details. This theoretical framework pertains only to optimal pen-
alties and does not pertain to penalties chosen within a political context. Rather, this analysis 
assumes a political link between optimal and actual penalties in order to utilize the theory 
for guiding the subsequent empirical analysis. 
2 7 Environment Indices and Standards for the Decontamination of Soil and Groundwater, 
Procedures for the Assessment of the Obligations of Enterprises with Regard to Environmen-
tal Protection, Law No. 92/1991, Annex 2 § 3. 
2 8 In support of this view, Ministry of the Environment officials state that a property owner 
"must pay for remediation of its contaminated soil and groundwater even in cases when no 
regulation is found to be breached." Ladislav Bfza, private conversation (May 1993); Mar-
keta Harbichova, private conversation (May 1993). 
2 9 Water Act of 1973 (cited in note 23), § 27. 
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TABLE 1 
ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES TO WATER-DAMAGING ACCIDENTS, 1 9 8 8 - 9 2 
MONETARY FINES REMEDIATION COSTS 
Average Average 
Total Value Value Total Value Value 
YEAR ACCIDENTS N ( 1 9 9 2 Kcs) (1992 Kcs) N ( 1 9 9 2 Kcs) (1992 Kcs) 
1988 5 8 4 3 0 0 4 1 , 6 5 9 , 8 8 1 138 ,866 4 4 9 , 2 7 6 , 6 2 7 210 ,832 
1989 6 5 4 3 4 0 3 1 , 9 6 0 , 4 6 3 94 ,001 361 2 6 , 2 4 4 , 8 8 4 72 ,701 
1990 5 9 8 2 6 8 2 2 , 3 2 5 , 1 0 3 83 ,303 170 12 ,077 ,124 71 ,042 
1991 501 2 0 9 12 ,888 ,024 6 1 , 6 6 5 4 3 9 , 4 4 9 , 7 9 1 219 ,763 
1992 4 1 5 149 10 ,119 ,702 6 7 , 9 1 7 41 19 ,661 ,021 4 7 9 , 5 3 7 
SOURCE.—Czech Inspection, Water Management Division, unpublished material. 
NOTE.—Czech korunas (Kcs) deflated by the consumer price index for the Czech Republic (Source: 
Czech Statistical Office, Czech Statistical Yearbook, 1993). 
posed on the organization responsible for an accident according to the fol-
lowing factors:3 0 
1) the quantity and nature of the harmful substance, 
2) the level of damages caused, 
3) the effect on water quality and the sensitivity of the area, 
4) the degree of protection granted to the affected water, 
5) the entity's effort to remove harmful substances (in other words, re-
mediation), and 
6) circumstances. 
A negligence rule appears to guide monetary fines since factor 6 permits 
water authorities to consider mitigating circumstances and the Water Act of 
1973 stipulates monetary fines to be imposed only when a regulation has 
been breached.31 
By law and frequently in practice, water authorities can and do impose 
remediation and monetary fines simultaneously.32 Table 1 presents a recent 
history of enforcement responses to water-damaging accidents. As shown, 
the annual number of accidents which have prompted a monetary fine has 
greatly decreased since 1988, even after taking into account the drop in ac-
cidents. More important, the average monetary fine imposed has dropped 
significantly. In the case of required remediation, the average remediation 
cost imposed has greatly increased since 1989, even though the number of 
3 0 State Water Administration Act of 1974 (cited in note 24), § 24. 
3 1 Water Act of 1973 (cited in note 23), § 47. 
3 2 Id, §§ 27, 47. 
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remediation requirements in 1991 and 1992 is only a fraction of what was 
demanded in 1989 and 1990. 
B. The Database on Water-Damaging Accidents 
Since 1988, Czech Water Inspection has maintained a database on indi-
vidual water-damaging accidents. An extract for the years 1988-92 in-
cludes the following penalties: (1) required remediation costs (adjusted to 
1992 levels), and (2) a monetary fine (adjusted to 1992 levels). In addition, 
the database contains variables relevant to the Czech water authorities' de-
cisions to impose penalties. Of these variables, this study utilizes the fol-
lowing: 
1) type of water affected: 
a) surface 
b) ground 
2) primary cause of the accident: 
a) human error 




3) secondary cause of the accident:33 
a) human error 
b) not human error 
4) economic group of the responsible party: 
a) agriculture 
b) heavy industry 
c) other industry 
d) citizens 
e) military/foreign 
5) location of the accident by Czech Water Inspection region: 
a) Brno 
b) Ceske Budejovice 
c) Havlickuv Brod 
d) Hradec Kralove 
e) Karlovy Vary 
/ ) Liberec 
g) Prerov/Olomouc 3 4 
3 3 In some cases, two factors contribute to the cause of the accident. 
3 4 This region was renamed in 1989. 
386 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
h) Ostrava 
0 Plzen 
j) Usti nad Labem 
k) Prague 
6) year of the accident 
7) measured damages caused by the accident (adjusted to 1992 levels) 
8) type of contaminant involved: 
a) oil contaminant 
b) chemical contaminant 
c) other contaminant 
9) fish killed by the accident: 
a) yes 
b) no 
The year and location of the accident can be linked to the surface water 
quality (here represented by biological oxygen demand) of the Czech Water 
Inspection region affected by the accident.35 The year of the accident places 
each observation in a political regime. For the purposes of empirical analy-
sis, the years 1988-89 are regarded as a communist political regime, and 
the years 1990-92 are regarded as a democratic political regime because 
the old communist regime collapsed in November 1989. (Of course, this 
division disregards any transitional period when neither regime was domi-
nant. Section IIA depicts a fairly quick transition, so this omission should 
have little effect on the results.) The database contains a total of 2,710 acci-
dents; the responsible party was identified in 2,298 of these cases. Since 
penalties cannot be imposed on unidentified polluters, these observations 
are dropped from the analysis.36 
Table 2 presents a statistical summary of all the included variables. First, 
note that damages were measured in only 421 of the 2,298 accidents. Sec-
ond, note that the average damage measurement was about Kcs 40,000 (Kcs 
= korunas), or less than $1,600. According to an official at Czech Water 
3 5 Although many parameters may represent water quality, the most prominent parameter 
is biological oxygen demand because it is reported in Czech Water Inspection's yearbooks. 
3 6 Complete documentation of the compiled data is available on request. The database 
lacks information on risk attitudes and enterprise insolvency constraints (in other words, im-
posed penalties exceed an enterprises's assets), which Shavell and Cohen show may critically 
determine the authorities' choice of an ex post liability rule. Shavell (cited in note 4); Cohen 
(cited in note 4). When the population of polluters is heterogeneous with respect to risk atti-
tudes and insolvency constraints yet water authorities can discern these characteristics, the 
authorities may opt to match the chosen liability rule to each polluter. Lacking information 
on these characteristics for individual polluters, this analysis would fail to distinguish this 
matching of liability rules. In essence, this analysis would then only capture the dominant 
liability rule. I thank an anonymous referee for prompting this insight. 
TABLE 2 
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT VARIABLES 
A . DISCRETE VARIABLES 
Variable and Value yy y 
Water: 
Surface 1,533 6 6 ? 
Ground 755 3 
Cause—primary: 
Human error 1,022 446 
Technical 505 2 2 0 
Other HI 4 g 
Transport 390 1 7 0 
Unknown 234 102 
Natural 36 1 > 6 
Cause—secondary: 
Human error 556 24 3 
Not human error 1,742 75 8 
Economic activity: 
Agriculture 651 28.3 
Heavy industry 652 28.4 
Other industry 713 3 ^ Q 
Citizen 45 2 . 0 
Military/foreign 237 10.3 
Political regime: 
Communist: 1988-89 1,035 45.0 
Democratic: 1990-92 1,263 55.0 
Contaminant: 
0 i l 1,277 55.6 
Chemical 413 18 0 
Other 602 26.3 
Damage measurement: 
Measured 421 18.3 
Unmeasured 1,877 81.7 
Inspectorate region: 
Brno 226 9.8 
Ceske Budejovice 228 9.9 
Havlickuv Brod 40 1.7 
Hradec Kralove 350 15.2 
Karlovy Vary 137 6.0 
Liberec 54 2.3 
Prerov/Olomouc* 239 10.4 
Ostrava 305 13.3 
Plzen 157 6.8 
Usti nad Labem 298 13.0 
Prague 264 11.5 
Fish kill: 
Yes 423 18.4 
No 1,875 81.6 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
B. CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 








Damages (1992 Kcs) 8,064 421 44,015 1,566 114,742 
Surface water quality 
(milligrams/liter) 3.99 2,298 .951 
Monetary fine (1992 Kcs) 51,737 1,264 90,060 3,205 147,300 
Remediation cost (1992 Kcs) 32,560 609 122,862 4,372 296,581 
* Region renamed in 1989. 
t Number of observations with positive values. 
$ Includes only positive values. 
§ Includes only positive values. Czech = U.S. exchange rate in 1992: 1 U.S. dollar = 28.1 korunas. 
(Source: Business Central Europe. Country Indicators 73, (May 1993).) 
Inspection, measurements generally include only certain components of en-
vironmental damages caused by accidents: losses from dead commercial 
fish and destroyed agricultural crops.3 7 Third, monetary fines actually im-
posed average about Kcs 90,000, or $3,200. Without information on busi-
ness sales revenue or profits, it is difficult to understand the effect of these 
monetary fines. As a rough guide, in 1992, per capita gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) was $2,212, and the average monthly wage was Kcs 4,689, or 
$167.3 8 For international comparison, in 1991, the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency imposed administrative fines averaging $23,937, while per 
capita GDP in the US was $22,699 and the average monthly wage was 
$1,793.39 In absolute terms, the average Czech fine seems small compared 
to the average U.S. fine. However, after adjusting for differences in per cap-
ita income, the average Czech fine seems substantial compared to the aver-
age U.S. fine: the ratio of fine to per capita income is 1.45 for the Czech 
Republic yet only 1.05 for the United States. The same conclusion results 
when relating average fines to average monthly wages: the ratio of fine to 
wage is 19.21 for the Czech Republic yet only 13.35 for the United States. 
Fourth, remediation costs required by Czech water authorities averaged 
3 7 Daniel Pulpan, private conversations (January-June 1993). 
3 8 Business Central Europe, Country Indicators 73 (May 1993); Czech Statistical Office, 
Survey of Indicators of Economics and Social Development, Czech Statistical Yearbook 
(1993). 
3 9 US Environmental Protection Agency, Enforcement Accomplishments Report: FY 1991 
(Document No 300-R92-008, Office of Enforcement (LE-133), April 1992); US Department 
of Commerce—US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review—Employment and 
Earnings (March, June 1992). 
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about Kcs 123,000, or less than $4,400. Since this cost is greater than the 
average Czech fine yet smaller than the average U.S. fine, similar conclu-
sions can be drawn. 
V . ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF WATER-DAMAGING ACCIDENTS 
Using the described data, I explore enforcement responses to water-
damaging accidents in the Czech Republic during the communist and dem-
ocratic political periods by determining the driving factors behind the two 
penalty decisions. In particular, I explore whether Czech enforcement re-
sponses changed in noticeable ways between the two political systems. 
A. Structuring the Outcome Relationships and Estimation Techniques 
Each accident entails a decision on both required remediation costs and 
imposed monetary fines. Therefore, econometric analysis must estimate the 
joint determination of these enforcement responses, which warrants a simul-
taneous equations model. However, the principal-agent model implies that 
determination of the dependent variables is recursive; in other words, the 
principal chooses the level of remediation first, independent of the monetary 
fine, and the monetary fine second, dependent on the costs of the chosen 
remediation level.4 0 In a fully recursive model, where all error terms are 
uncorrected, the regression system can be estimated consistently and effi-
ciently using equation-by-equation analysis:41 (1) remediation costs as a 
function of the explanatory variables, and (2) monetary fines as a function 
of the same explanatory variables, plus remediation costs.42 
4 0 To understand the recursive nature of these decisions, note that the principal's objective 
consists of two independent concerns: (1) pollution damages and remediation costs associated 
with each particular accident and (2) deterrence. For each level of pollution caused by a given 
accident, the principal chooses the optimal level of remediation, which minimizes the sum of 
remediation costs and environmental damages caused by any remaining pollution following 
remediation. Thus, remediation is chosen solely for environmental reasons. Even though re-
mediation costs constitute part of the total penalty imposed on the polluter, deterrence is 
based solely on the total penalty as a whole, not its individual components. In order to create 
the proper level of deterrence, the principal chooses an optimal schedule of total penalties 
for all levels of pollution, which induces the polluter to provide effort that minimizes ex-
pected social costs. The optimal monetary fine is simply the difference between the optimal 
total penalty and the cost of optimal remediation. In essence, the optimal level of remediation 
is selected first, and the optimal monetary fine—the additional punch needed to provide the 
proper deterrence—is selected second. 
4 1 William Greene, Econometric Analysis (1993). 
4 2 As one means of testing this recursive structure, I combine the two penalties into a sin-
gle dependent variable and compare the estimation results with those for the two penalties 
separately. Coefficient estimates for the composite penalty significantly differ from the esti-
mates for both individual penalties in both political periods. In the case of remediation costs, 
Wald test statistics for the communist and democratic periods are 200.1 and 166.8, respec-
tively, both significant at the 1 percent level. For monetary fines, Wald test statistics for the 
communist and democratic periods are 249.7 and 204.9, respectively, both significant at the 
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In turn, I estimate two separate econometric models based on the time 
period used to establish the relationships between the dependent and ex-
planatory variables. Model 1 uses data for the years 1988—89—the commu-
nist political regime. Model 2 uses data for the years 1990-92—the demo-
cratic political regime. I do not pool the data since I find a structural break 
in the regression system between the two political regimes. Estimates of the 
coefficients common to the two models, as a group, differ significantly be-
tween the political regimes. Wald test statistics for remediation costs and 
monetary fines are 117.1 and 61.2, respectively, both significant at the 1 
percent level. 
In the case of remediation costs, I choose a log-linear specification based 
on results from a test for linearity versus log linearity.43 For both political 
regimes, I can reject the linear specification but cannot reject the log-linear 
specification.44 As for monetary fines, I choose a linear specification based 
on results from the identical test noted above. For the communist regime, I 
cannot reject the linear specification but can reject the log-linear specifica-
tion. However, for the democratic regime, I generate the opposite results; I 
can reject the linear specification but cannot reject the log-linear specifica-
tion.4 5 In order to compare the empirical results between the two political 
periods, I must use only one specification. Theory suggests that the linear 
specification is more appropriate. 
Censoring affects both dependent variables. Required remediation costs 
are bottom-censored at zero—1,689 of the 2,298 accidents prompted no re-
mediation. According to the State Water Administration Act of 1974, the 
monetary fine is bottom-censored at Kcs 10,000 and top-censored at Kcs 
1,000,000 (both in nominal terms).4 6 An examination of the data reveals that 
1 percent level. (I thank an anonymous referee for this suggested comparison.) As a second 
means of testing the recursive structure, I show that the coefficient estimates for the two 
individual penalties differ significantly in both political periods. Wald test statistics for the 
communist and democratic periods are 381.0 and 274.2, respectively, both significant at the 
1 percent level. All of these results support the recursive structure. 
4 3 R. Davidson and J. MacKinnon, Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence 
of Alternative Hypotheses, 49 Econometrica 781 (1981). 
4 4 f-test statistics for the linear and log-linear specifications in model 1 (communist re-
gime) are -7 .01 and 1.55, respectively, and are significant at 1 percent and 12 percent levels, 
respectively, t-test statistics for the linear and log-linear specifications in model 2 (democratic 
regime) are -11.02 and 1.22, respectively, and are significant at 1 percent and 22 percent 
levels, respectively. 
4 5 f-test statistics for the linear and log-linear specifications in model 1 (communist re-
gime) are -1 .23 and 2.12, respectively, and are significant at 22 percent and 5 percent levels, 
respectively, f-test statistics for the linear and log-linear specifications in model 2 (democratic 
regime) are -5 .15 and 1.04, respectively, and are significant at 1 percent and 30 percent 
levels, respectively. 
4 6 State Water Administration Act of 1974 (cited in note 24), § 24. 
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top-censoring appears not to be important: the maximum monetary fine is 
imposed in only five cases. As further evidence, inclusion of a top limit in 
the estimation fails to alter significantly the coefficient estimates.47 Conse-
quently, the top-censoring problem is ignored. Also on examination, the 
bottom-censoring of monetary fines actually occurs at Kcs 0—not Kcs 
10,000.48 Zero values indicate censoring in both dependent variables since 
Czech water authorities may wish to impose negative penalties in order to 
induce the optimal effort from polluters. As one way of handling this com-
plication, I make the Tobit assumptions and estimate the regression system 
with maximum likelihood techniques 4 9 Estimation results of remediation 
costs and monetary fines are given in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. 
B. Estimation Results and Interpretations 
The driving factors behind penalty decisions divide into five main cate-
gories: information on preventive effort (in other words, causes of acci-
dents), measured damages, environmental factors, regional factors, and po-
litical influence. 
How information on preventive effort and measured damages drives pen-
alty decisions can be discerned by identifying the operative liability rule. 
First, I establish a connection between accident causes and negligence. In 
the case of primary causes, judged against some standard of preventive ef-
fort, human errors and technical errors indicate negligence, while unknown 
or natural causes indicate lack of negligence; the translation of ' 'other" and 
transport causes into negligence is left ambiguous. Given this logic, I create 
a measure of negligence by establishing unknown/natural causes as the 
benchmark against which I judge the relative effects of the remaining cause 
categories. Similarly, in the case of secondary causes, I create a measure of 
negligence by establishing "not human error" as the benchmark against 
which I judge the relative effect of secondary human error. Given this map-
ping between causes and negligence, the relative effects of cause categories 
should be zero under a strict liability rule and positive under a negligence 
rule. See Table 5 for how coefficient signs of cause variables relate to liabil-
ity rules. 
In general, greater damages should lead to higher penalties. Under a strict 
4 7 Since the legal limit of Kcs 1 million applies to nominal values, I estimate the monetary 
fine equation for each individual year. Wald test statistics for the years 1988 through 1992 
are 0.004, 0.000, 0.193, 0.065, and 0.000, respectively, and are significant only at levels 
greater than 10 percent. 
4 8 Of course, I cannot rule out the possibility that a certain percentage of the accidents are 
bottom-censored at Kcs 10,000 and the remaining accidents are not. 
4 9 G. S. Maddala, Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (1983). 
TABLE 3 
TOBIT ESTIMATION OF REMEDIATION COSTS (LOGARITHM VALUES) 
Communist Democratic 
Variable Regime Regime Difference3 
Primary human cause1 1.932** 1.742 
(-843) (1.401) 
Other cause1 2.042 .868 
(1.327) (2.075) 
Transport cause1 1.651* .656 
(.994) (1.544) 
Technical cause1 2.630*** 1.429 
(.872) (1.450) 
Secondary human cause2 .770 -1 .046 .10 (.629) (.937) 
In (measured damages) 1.199*** 2.068*** .01 (.066) (-110) 
Agriculture3 -3.551*** - . 289 .01 (.673) (.990) 
Other industry3 -2.848*** -2.282** 
(.625) (.944) 
Citizens3 -9.832*** - . 6 5 8 .05 (4.004) (2.278) 
Military/foreign entities3 -5.046*** -3.141** 
(1.031) (1.385) 
Groundwater4 - . 0 7 0 1.325* 
(.544) (.784) 
In (surface water quality) 7.214 4.890 
(4.631) (4.593) 
Oil contaminant5 - . 849 2.973*** .01 
Chemical contaminant5 
(.634) (1.049) 
-2.062*** 1.295 .01 
Brno6 
(.793) (1.231) 




Havlfckuv Brod 6 , b 
(1*935) (2.989) 
-24 .683 
Hradec Kralove6 (217.4) 4.506** 4.340** 
(1.965) (2.003) Karlovy Vary6 2.894 2.784 
Liberec 6 b 
(1.886) (2.611) 
7.652** 
Prerov/Olomouc6 (3.718) 3.019** 2.809* 
Ostrava6 (1.352) (1.647) 5.177** 5.635*** 
(2.643) (2.211) Plzen6 10.006*** 11.808*** 
(2.366) (3.124) Usti nad Labem6 1.961** .102 
(.971) (1.882) 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Communist Democratic 
Variable Regime Regime Difference 3 
Fish kill 7 .587 - . 694 
(.628) (1.028) 
No. of observations 1,035 1,263 
Normal SD 5.637 7.624 
Log-likelihood -1 ,397 -1 ,008 
NOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Regression also includes a constant and indicator variables 
for individual years, coefficients for which are not shown here. Omitted indicator categories are desig-
nated by superscript numbers: 1 = unknown/natural causes; 2 = not human error; 3 = heavy industry; 
4 = surface water; 5 = other contaminant; 6 = Prague inspectorate region; and 7 = no fish kill. 
a This is the significance level of statistical difference between two estimates. 
b There are no observations in the inspectorate region under the communist regime. 
* Statistically significant at the .10 level. 
** Statistically significant at the .05 level. 
*** Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
liability rule, penalties are imposed whenever damages are caused; thus, the 
effect of damages on penalties is large. Under a negligence rule, penalties 
are imposed only when effort is deemed negligent; thus, the effect of dam-
ages is smaller than under a strict liability rule. In the case of remediation 
costs, the coefficient on damages does not identify which rule is operative 
because the optimal level of remediation depends not only on damages but 
also on the cost structure of remediation.50 In the case of monetary fines, 
an identifiable benchmark value for the coefficient on measured damages 
delineates which rule is operative. Since the probability of detection is 
definitely less than one (recall that Czech Water Inspection identified 2,710 
accidents but detected the responsible party in only 2,298 of these cases) 
and inflation of detected damages is needed to provide deterrence from un-
detected damages, under a strict liability rule the coefficient on damages is 
greater than one. 5 1 The coefficient is less than one only under a negligence 
rule, given that negligence varies within each cause category (for example, 
human error can be both minor and egregious).52 However, coefficients 
greater than one can occur under both rules. Under a negligence rule, a suf-
ficiently low probability of detection, requiring inflation of the monetary 
fine in order to provide necessary deterrence from undetected damages, can 
offset the weaker connection between damages and monetary fines and 
5 0 For details on the optimal level of remediation, see note 40 above; and Cohen (cited in 
note 4). 
5 1 For details on optimal monetary fines, see Cohen (cited in note 4). 
5 2 The coefficient can be less than one, even under a strict liability rule, if polluters bear 
costs in addition to the two penalties, such as reputational losses. I thank a referee for this 
point. 
TABLE 4 
TOBIT ESTIMATION OF MONETARY FINES 
Communist Democratic 
Variable Regime Regime Difference3 
Primary human cause1 -21,981 -22,182 
(26,860) (18,290) 
Other cause1 -86,130* -75,153*** 
(45,880) (30,630) 
Transport cause1 -59,040* -32,009 
(34,010) (20,640) 
Technical cause1 -3 ,804 10,447 
(28,800) (18,780) 
Secondary human cause2 6,538 41,556*** 
(22,700) (12,660) 
Measured damages .235*** .098 
(.067) (.102) 










Military/foreign entities3 -279,650*** -168,890*** .01 
(38,540) (23,860) 
Groundwater4 24,113 8,602 
(19,480) (10,990) 
Surface water quality -39,652 23,199* 
Oil contaminant5 
(38,000) (13,890) 
55,797*** -4 ,513 .05 
(22,390) (13,460) Chemical contaminant5 48,760* -6 ,197 .10 
(27,450) (16,010) Brno 6 158,970*** -8 ,888 .01 
(33,640) (23,510) Ceske Budejovice6 10,101 131,560*** 
(68,730) (34,080) Havlfckuv Brod 6 b 93,877*** 
(31,180) Hradec Kralove6 38,973 77,316*** 
(61,590) (25,150) Karlovy Vary 6 126,610* 119,370*** 
Liberec 6 b 
(69,730) (32,400) 
57,447 
(41,640) Prerov/Olomouc6 21,989 22,891 
Ostrava6 (46,020) (22,600) -90,392 72,470*** .10 
(83,350) (27,710) Plzen 6 40,860 132,210*** 
(77,370) (36,650) Usti nad Labem6 129,970*** 77,251*** 
(33,590) (24,050) 
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Communist Democratic 
Variable Regime Regime Difference11 
Fish kill 7 17,489 550 
(22,530) (14,320) 
No. of observations 1,035 1,263 
Normal SD 239,840 149,670 Log-likelihood -9 ,045 -8 ,664 
NOTE.—Standard errors are in parentheses. Regression also includes a constant and indicator variables 
for individual years, coefficients for which are not shown here. Omitted indicator categories are desig-
nated by superscript numbers: 1 = unknown/natural causes; 2 = not human error; 3 = heavy industry; 
4 = surface water; 5 = other contaminant; 6 = Prague inspectorate region; and 7 = no fish kill. 
a This is the significance level of statistical difference between two estimates. 
b There are no observations in the inspectorate region under the communist regime. 
* Statistically significant at the .10 level. 
** Statistically significant at the .05 level. 
*** Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
cause the coefficient to be greater than one. See Table 5 for details on how 
coefficient magnitudes for damages relate to liability rules. 
First, I examine the liability rule for required remediation costs. As 
shown in Table 5, panel A, accidents caused primarily by human error, 
technical error, or transport events prompted greater remediation costs than 
accidents caused primarily by unknown or natural causes in the communist 
period. In the democratic period, however, accident causes do not influence 
remediation costs. With respect to measured damages, accidents causing 
greater damages prompted higher remediation costs in both political pe-
riods. Also, the effect of damages is significantly greater in the democratic 
period than in the communist period. These results indicate that a negli-
gence rule appears to guide remediation requirements in the communist pe-
riod,53 while a strict liability rule appears to guide remediation requirements 
in the democratic period. 5 4 Apparently, the Water Act's stipulation domi-
nates in the communist period, while the particular rule for remediating 
5 3 Under a negligence rule, the costs of performing the optimal level of remediation are 
not imposed on the polluter when its effort is deemed nonnegligent. Instead, the government 
(or society) bears these costs. In the case of water-damaging accidents, no available data 
show that Czech authorities, rather than the responsible polluter, ever bore the cost of remedi-
ation, regardless of the polluter's effort. However, when authorities failed to identify the re-
sponsible polluter (in 412 cases), authorities bore the cost of remediation in 50 cases, averag-
ing Kcs 37,735, or $1,343. 
5 4 As noted below, political influence appears less important in the democratic period than 
in the communist period. If true, without controlling for all political influence, this analysis 
may discern a stronger relationship between damages and remediation costs in the democratic 
period, regardless of any shift in the operative liability rule. I thank an anonymous referee 
for this point. 
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TABLE 5 
OPERATIVE LIABILITY RULES: COEFFICIENT SIGNS AND MAGNITUDES 
EXPECTED 
COEFFICIENT 
ESTIMATED CoEFficiENT a Strict 
VARIABLE Liability Negligence Communist Democratic Difference5 
A. Required remediation 
costs (logarithm 
values): 
Human cause =0 > 0 >0** = 0 
Other cause =0 > 0 =0 = 0 
Transport cause =0 > 0 >0* = 0 
Technical cause =0 > 0 = 0 
Secondary human cause =0 > 0 =0 = 0 .10 
In (measured damages) » 0 > 0 >0*** [=1.199] [=2.068] 
.01 
. Monetary fines: 
Human cause =0 > 0 =0 = 0 
Other cause =0 > 0 <0* 
Transport cause =0 > 0 <0* = 0 
Technical cause = 0 > 0 = 0 = 0 
Secondary human cause =0 > 0 =0 
Measured damages >1 > 0 <1 *** 
[=.235] [=.098] 
NOTE.—The /-statistics for testing whether the coefficient on measured damages for monetary fines is 
less than one for the communist regime and the democratic regime are, respectively, 11.42 and 8.84. 
a Estimated coefficient signs indicated as equal to zero are significantly different from zero at a level 
higher than 0.10. 
b Significance level of statistical difference between coefficient estimates using a Wald test. 
* Statistically significant at the .10 level. 
** Statistically significant at the .05 level. 
*** Statistically significant at the .01 level 
contaminated soil and/or groundwater generalizes only for the democratic 
period. 
Next, I examine the liability rule for assigning monetary fines. As shown 
in Table 5, panel B, in both political periods, accidents caused primarily 
by "other" factors prompted lower monetary fines than accidents caused 
primarily by unknown or natural factors, inconsistent with either liability 
rule.55 Similarly, in the communist period, accidents caused primarily by 
transport factors prompted lower monetary fines. In the democratic period, 
5 5 Uncertainty surrounding evidence necessary to prove negligence may affect the cause 
coefficients. In particular, it may be more difficult to prove negligence in cases involving 
"other" causes, relative to more prominent causes, such as human errors. For more informa-
tion on uncertainty and a negligence rule, see Richard Craswell and John Calfee, Deterrence 
and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J L, Econ, & Org 279 (1986). 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAWS 397 
secondary human error increased monetary fines. Otherwise, accident 
causes do not seem to influence monetary fine decisions, giving little sup-
port to a negligence rule operating. Nevertheless, the coefficient on mea-
sured damages is significantly less than one in both political periods, unam-
biguously indicating a negligence rule. These conclusions are consistent 
with my expectations. 
In addition to accident causes and damages, environmental, regional, and 
political factors drive penalty decisions. Environmental factors offer insight 
into broader policy objectives and may provide information on unmeasured 
damages, which may prove quite important, given the frequency of damage 
measurements and the inclusion of only certain damage components. 
When considering remediation costs, estimates give quite interesting re-
sults, as shown in Table 3. First, in the democratic period, accidents damag-
ing groundwater prompted higher penalties than accidents damaging sur-
face water. This result is consistent with Czech authorities' concerns for 
groundwater expressed in a 1991 government decree granting special pro-
tection to groundwater sources and in Czech Water Inspection's year-
books.5 6 This result is also consistent with the notion that groundwater is 
generally more costly to remediate. Second, in the democratic period, acci-
dents involving oil contaminants prompted greater remediation costs than 
accidents involving 4 'other" contaminants, which is consistent with the 
concern for oil contaminants expressed in Czech Water Inspection's year-
books. In the communist period, chemical contaminants decreased remedia-
tion costs relative to 4 'other" contaminants. In both cases, the effect of con-
taminant type possibly captures the cost side of remediation decisions. 
The estimated effects of regional factors indicate that no inspectorate im-
posed less stringent remediation requirements than the Prague inspectorate 
during both political periods. Perhaps this result reflects greater political in-
fluence on the part of polluters located in the capital city region of Prague. 
Political influence, as captured by the effects of different economic 
groups on penalty decisions, explains how certain groups of polluters re-
ceive relatively harsh or preferential treatment according to their political 
position or maneuvering. Surprisingly, heavy industry received the harshest 
remediation requirements of all economic groups in both political periods. 
Under communism, the former Czechoslovak government greatly promoted 
heavy industry. Central planning policies 44promoted an economic structure 
biased toward heavy industries and the energy sector, which accounted for 
approximately 60 % of total output throughout the 1980's." 5 7 However, this 
5 6 Czech Government Decree No. 85/1991. 
5 7 World Bank (cited in note 2). 
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promotion did not translate into preferential treatment.5 8 Relative to heavy 
industry, military and foreign entities did receive preferential treatment in 
both periods. Most likely, these entities were beyond the regulatory control 
of water authorities, especially under communism, since water authorities 
probably lacked power vis-a-vis stronger state organizations, as suggested 
by the Czech Ministry of the Environment.59 This result is consistent with 
Catherine Albrecht's depiction of Czechoslovak environmental authorities' 
relative power.6 0 
Although present in both periods, the importance of political influence is 
more pronounced in the communist period, consistent with the greater po-
tential for and reliance on political maneuvering in that period. As a group, 
the effects of various economic groups are significantly greater in the com-
munist period.61 As for changes in individual economic categories, both 
agriculture and citizens were treated significantly less favorably (relative to 
heavy industry) in the democratic period than in the communist period. 
In the case of monetary fines, estimates also give intriguing results, as 
shown in Table 4. Judging by the effects of surface water quality, authori-
ties shifted from a neutral stance with respect to protection priorities in the 
communist period to a strategy emphasizing the correction of problem areas 
(in other words, low water quality) in the democratic period. Accidents in-
volving either oil or chemical contaminants prompted higher monetary fines 
than accidents involving "other" contaminants in the communist period. 
Apparently, water authorities followed the State Water Administration Act 
of 1974 by incorporating the nature of the harmful substance into monetary 
fine decisions. In addition, the coefficients on the two indicator variables 
for the contaminant type are significantly greater in the communist period 
than in the democratic period. In this regard, monetary fine decisions were 
more sensitive to unmeasured damages in the communist period than in the 
democratic period. 
As for regional factors, the effects of various inspectorate regions reveal 
that no inspectorate imposed lower monetary fines than Prague in both po-
litical periods, similar to remediation requirements. In addition, this prefer-
5 8 One possible explanation for this result is that heavy industry is positively correlated 
with the severity of accidents not captured by the included explanatory variables. 
5 9 Czech Ministry of the Environment (cited in note 5). 
6 0 Catherine Albrecht, Environmental Policies and Politics in Contemporary Czechoslova-
kia, 20 Stud Comp Communism 291 (1987). Other analyses depict a similar relationship in 
the former Soviet Union. See Charles Ziegler, Environmental Policy in the USSR (1987); 
D. J. Peterson, Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction (1993). 
6 1 The Wald test statistic is 11.28 and is significant at the 5 percent level. 
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ential treatment offered to Prague polluters is more prominent in the demo-
cratic period. 6 2 
As with remediation requirements, political influence is evident under 
both regimes. In both periods, heavy industry received the highest monetary 
fines of all economic groups (contrary to expectations),63 while military and 
foreign entities received significantly favorable treatment (relative to heavy 
industry). In addition, 4 'other" industry received favorable treatment under 
communism. Moreover, the importance of political influence is more pro-
nounced under the communist regime, also similar to remediation require-
ments. As a group, the effects of economic groups are significantly greater 
in the communist period. 6 4 This result, especially with regard to military and 
foreign entities, may not be surprising given the democratic government's 
efforts to restructure Czech society. 
V I . SUMMARY 
This article examines the enforcement of water protection laws in the 
Czech Republic using data on penalties imposed in response to water-
damaging accidents during the years 1988-92. Empirical analysis explores 
the driving factors behind penalty decisions during the two political re-
gimes—communism and democracy—separately and compares the results. 
In particular, it identifies the operative liability rules. Based on my reading 
of Czech water regulations and personal conversations with Czech environ-
mental officials, a strict liability or a negligence rule may guide remediation 
requirements, while a negligence rule should guide monetary fines. 
Estimation of enforcement responses gives the following results. The lia-
bility rule guiding remediation requirements shifts from a negligence rule 
in the communist period to a strict liability rule in the democratic period, 
while a negligence rule guides monetary fines in both political periods. 
Most interesting, political influence drives both penalty decisions, espe-
cially under communism; most prominent is the preferential treatment given 
to military and foreign entities and the diminished preference shown during 
the democratic period. In addition, the effects of surface water quality and 
6 2 As additional evidence, collectively the effects of individual inspectorate regions are 
significantly different between the two political periods. The Wald test statistic is 31.67 and 
is significant at the 0.5 percent level. 
6 3 One possible explanation is a positive correlation between heavy industry and the sever-
ity of accidents not captured by this analysis. As a second possible explanation, any greater 
recidivism in heavy industry would have prompted higher monetary fines according to the 
State Water Administration Act (cited in note 24), § 24. 
6 4 The Wald test statistic is 9.48 and is significant at the 5 percent level. 
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type of affected water indicate broader water protection policies. Similarly, 
penalties varied significantly across individual regions reflecting efforts to 
accommodate local conditions. 
The identified liability rules for remediation requirements reflect the am-
biguity of my prior expectations, while the identified liability rules for mon-
etary fines match nicely with my prior expectations. The greater importance 
of political influence in the communist period is consistent with the poten-
tial for and reliance on political maneuvering in that period. The preferen-
tial treatment granted military and foreign entities under communism comes 
as little surprise, but the continued favorable treatment under democracy 
may seem curious. The harsh treatment levied on heavy industry was very 
unexpected. Finally, the importance of environmental factors is especially 
appropriate since these factors may be capturing unmeasured damages. 
This empirical analysis can easily be applied to other environmental top-
ics in the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe, where envi-
ronmental protection efforts have significantly changed. Nevertheless, the 
Czech Republic is an excellent case to examine because of the stark con-
trast between the communist and democratic regimes. Presumably, empiri-
cal analysis of other transitional economies, such as Hungary and Poland, 
where the contrast between political regimes is more subtle, would demand 
a greater differentiation of political change and lead to less clear results. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Albrecht, Catherine. 4'Environmental Policies and Politics in Contemporary 
Czechoslovakia." Studies in Comparative Communism 20 (1987): 291-302. 
Atlee, Tom. "Notes on Czechoslovakian Grassroots Activism: Findings and Rec-
ommendations." Unpublished manuscript. Prague: Czechoslovak Federal Minis-
try for the Environment, 1991. 
Becker, Gary. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach." Journal of Po-
litical Economy 78 (1968): 526-36. 
Biza, Ladislav. Deputy director, Department of Water Protection, Czech Ministry 
of the Environment. Private conversations in Prague, the Czech Republic, May 
1993. 
Coate, Malcolm, and McChesney, Fred. 4 'Empirical Evidence on FTC Enforcement 
of the Merger Guidelines." Economic Inquiry 30 (1992): 277-293. 
Cohen, Mark. "Optimal Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Applica-
tion of a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard." Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics 30 (1987): 23-51. 
Cohen, Mark. "Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory 
and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes." 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 82 (1992): 1054-1108. 
Cohen, Mark. "The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Sen-
tencing." International Review of Law and Economics 12 (1992): 12-30. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAWS 401 
Craswell, Richard, and Calfee, John. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards." 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2 (1986): 279-303. 
Czech Ministry of the Environment. Environment of the Czech Republic: Evolution, 
Situations, and Trends to the End of 1989. Prague: Academia, 1990. 
Czech Ministry of the Environment. Environment of the Czech Republic: State of 
the Environment 1992. Prague: Academia, 1992. 
Deily, Mary, and Gray, Wayne. "Enforcement of Pollution Regulations in a Declin-
ing Industry." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 21 (1991): 
260-74. 
Earnhart, Dietrich. "Public Influence on Environmental Protection Efforts: Water-
Related Citizen Correspondence in the Czech Republic." Unpublished manu-
script. Madison: University of Wisconsin—Madison, 1995. 
Finsinger, J.; Hoehn, T.; and Pototschnig, A. "The Enforcement of Product Liabil-
ity Rules: A Two-Country Analysis of Court Cases." International Review of 
Law and Economics 11 (1991): 133-48. 
Goshko, Ana. "The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic in Transition." Congres-
sional Research Service Report for Congress No. 92-52F. Washington, DC: Li-
brary of Congress, Congressional Research Service, December 27, 1991. 
Greene, William. Econometric Analysis. New York: Macmillan, 1993. 
Harbichova, Marketa. Legal counsel, Czech Ministry of the Environment, Depart-
ment of Water Protection. Private conversations in Prague, the Czech Republic, 
May 1993. 
Hubbard, K., and Selden, T. "Environmental Failures of Central Planning." Society 
and Natural Resources 7 (1994): 169-80. 
Hughes, Gordon. "Are the Costs of Cleaning Up Eastern Europe Exaggerated? 
Economic Reform and the Environment." Oxford Review of Economic Policy 1 
(1992): 106-36. 
Hunter, David, and Bowman, Margaret. "An Overview of the Environmental Com-
munity in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic." Unpublished manuscript. 
Washington, D.C.: Center for International Environmental Law—United States, 
1991. 
Krupnick, Alan; Harrison, Ken; Nickell, Eric; and Toman, Michael. "The Value of 
Health Benefits from Ambient Air Quality Improvements in Central and Eastern 
Europe: An Exercise in Benefits Transfer." Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics 1 (1996): 307-32. 
Maddala, G. S. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
Nash, John. "To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime: A Theory and Statistical Esti-
mation of A Multi-period Optimal Deterrence Model." International Review of 
Law and Economics 11 (1991): 101-10. 
Peterson, D. J. Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction. 
Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1993. 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Shavell, Steven. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal 
Magnitude and Probability of Fines." Journal of Law and Economics 35 (1992): 
133-148. 
Pulpan, Daniel. Inspector of the Czech Inspection—Water Management Division, 
402 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
Central Office. Private conversations in Prague, the Czech Republic, January-
June 1993. 
Shavell, Steven. 4 'Risk-Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relation-
ship." Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1979): 55-73. 
Shavell, Steven. Economic Analysis of Accident Law. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1987. 
Snyder, Edward. "The Effect of Higher Criminal Penalties on Antitrust Enforce-
ment." Journal of Law and Economics 33 (1990): 439-62. 
World Bank. "Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Joint Environmental Study." 
Vols. 1, 2. Joint report of the Governments of Czechoslovakia, Czech and Slovak 
Republics, European Community, and United States. Washington, DC: World 
Bank Publications, 1992. 
Ziegler, Charles. Environmental Policy in the USSR. Amherst: University of Massa-
chusetts Press, 1987. 
